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COMMENTS
THE ANTITHETICAL DEFINITION OF PERSONAL
SEIZURE: FILLING THE SUPREME COURT GAP IN
ANALYZING SECTION 1983 EXCESSIVE-FORCE
CLAIMS ARISING AFTER ARREST AND BEFORE
PRETRIAL DETENTION
Diana E. Cole+
Responding to a noise complaint, police officers arrested two individuals,
handcuffed them, and placed them in a police vehicle. After forty-five
minutes, one of the arrestees became unruly, kicking and screaming in the
backseat. A police officer responded by threatening him with a Taser stun gun.
However, instead of drawing the Taser, the officer drew a semiautomatic pistol
and fired at the arrestee's chest, mortally wounding him. In a subsequent
lawsuit by the individual's family claiming that the officer used excessive
force, how should the police officer's conduct be evaluated? Should the family
be required to prove that the officer specifically intended to kill the victim, or
must they show only that the officer's conduct was unreasonable? Does it
matter whether the officer who pulled the trigger was the same officer who
initially arrested the victim?
Recently, in Torres v. City of Madera, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit determined that the Torres family only needed to
demonstrate that the officer's conduct was unreasonable in order to prevail in
the lawsuit.' Other circuit courts, however, would require the Torres family to
prove that the officer consciously disregarded a substantial risk to the
arrestee's life in order to recover-a substantially greater burden.2 Between
the time of initial arrest and pretrial detention, excessive-force claims are
analyzed differently by the courts depending on the fixed point in time at
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2010, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., 2007, Colby College. The author would like to thank Professor Cara Drinan for her
insightful comments and suggestions, the entire staff and editorial board of the Catholic
University Law Review for their diligent editing efforts, and her family for their love and
encouragement. Finally, the author would like to thank her loving husband, Chris, for his
patience and support.
1. Torres v. City of Madera, 524 F.3d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir. 2008). The fact pattern set
forth in the initial paragraph was drawn from this case. Id. at 1054-55.
2. See, e.g., Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1491-92 (1 1th Cir. 1986).
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which the assault occurs3 and the jurisdiction in which the arrestee brings suit,4
generating varying outcomes for excessive-force-claim plaintiffs.5
3. Compare Moore v. Novak, 146 F.3d 531, 532, 535 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that the
arrestee is seized at the booking process), and United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 206 (3d
Cir. 1997) (holding that seizure continues at the booking process), with Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d
1159, 1162 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding that seizure does not extend beyond arrest), Austin v.
Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that the Fourth Amendment is
controlling until the arrestee's "first judicial hearing" and ruling that the probable-cause hearing is
the appropriate end for seizure), Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[T]he
Fourth Amendment standard probably should be applied at least to the period prior to the time
when the person arrested is arraigned or formally charged, and remains in the custody (sole or
joint) of the arresting officer."), McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1306 (6th Cir. 1988)
("[T]he seizure that occurs when a person is arrested continues throughout the time the person
remains in the custody of the arresting officers."), and Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1010
(9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the arrestee's seizure "continues throughout the time the arrestee is
in the custody of the arresting officers").
4. Compare Johnstone, 107 F.3d at 206 (noting that in the Third Circuit seizure extends
from the initial arrest through the booking process), and Austin, 945 F.2d at 1160-62 (holding
that the Fourth Amendment standard of an unreasonable seizure extends to the probable-cause
hearing in the Tenth Circuit), with Riley, 115 F.3d at 1162 (concluding that in the Fourth Circuit
seizure does not extend after initial arrest), and Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1443-44
(5th Cir. 1993) (deciding that in the Fifth Circuit seizure ends at "the initial act of restricting an
individual's liberty"-the initial arrest).
5. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text; see also Jeffrey Sturgeon, Comment, A
Constitutional Right to Reasonable Treatment: Excessive Force and the Plight of Warrantless
Arrestees, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 125, 133-34 (2004) (noting the disparate treatment of excessive-
force claims in the federal circuit courts).
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42 U.S.C. § 19836 grants an arrestee the authority to bring excessive-force
claims against state police officers for violation of the arrestee's constitutional
rights.7 In § 1983 excessive-force claims, an arrestee's Fourth Amendment
rights, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights, and Eighth Amendment
rights are subject to abuse depending on the timing of the alleged abuse.8 Each
excessive-force claim is analyzed differently depending on which
constitutional right is implicated. 9 As a result, plaintiffs bringing excessive-
force claims carry different burdens of proof depending on what constitutional
right they allege has been violated.10 For example, plaintiffs bear a greater
burden in bringing § 1983 excessive-force claims for violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Eighth Amendment-requiring proof of the
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief
shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
In addition, the United States Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
Agents recognized a private cause of action for excessive-force claims against federal law-
enforcement officers under the Fourth Amendment. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). However,
negligence is not sufficient to violate the Constitution. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334
(1986). Further, 18 U.S.C. § 242 makes it a federal crime to violate an individual's constitutional
rights:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully
subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States . . . shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both ....
18 U.S.C. § 242 (2006).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Individuals also may also invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to bring claims
for violation of federal statutory rights. Id. To succeed in a § 1983 lawsuit, a plaintiff must prove
that the defendant was "acting under color of law" and that the defendant violated the plaintiff's
constitutional or federal statutory rights. ROLANDO V. DEL CARMEN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
LAW AND PRACTICE 421 (5th ed. 2001); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION
§§ 8-9, at 575-76 (5th ed. 2007) (noting that most § 1983 lawsuits are excessive-force claims
brought against state and local government officials).
8. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989).
9. Id. at 393-95, 395 n.10 (differentiating excessive-force claims arising under the Fourth
Amendment and the Eighth Amendment).
10. See id; see also Kathryn R. Urbonya, Establishing A Deprivation of a Constitutional
Right to Personal Security under Section 1983: The Use of Unjustified Force by State Officials in
Violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 51 ALB. L. REV. 173, 235 (1987)
(noting the disparate treatment of excessive-force claims arising under the Fourth Amendment,
Eighth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment before Graham v. Connor).
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subjective intent of the officer-than for violations of the Fourth
Amendment-requiring proof of the officer's objectively unreasonable
conduct. 1
The Supreme Court has delineated several principles for identifying which
constitutional rights are implicated in § 1983 excessive-force claims.' If the
excessive-force claim arises when the arrestee is seized by law enforcement,
then the arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights are implicated.' 3  If the
excessive-force claim arises when the arrestee is in pretrial detention, then the
arrestee's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights are implicated. 14 If the
excessive-force claim arises when the arrestee is convicted and imprisoned,
then the arrestee's Eighth Amendment rights are implicated. 5 Although the
Court has identified the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause as the sources of constitutional protection for § 1983
excessive-force claims arising before trial, 16 the Court has not indicated which
constitutional provision governs such claims arising between arrest and pretrial
11. See supra note 3; see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (finding that
"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" must be demonstrated in analyzing § 1983 excessive-
force claims under the Eighth Amendment (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670
(1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sturgeon, supra note 5, at 137-38 (noting that the
substantive Due Process standard imposes a higher burden on plaintiffs to prove subjective intent
and serious injury than the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard).
12. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 394; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
535 (1979).
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.");
Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 ("[We] hold that all claims that law enforcement officers have used
excessive force-deadly or not-in the course of arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a
free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment ... ").
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."); Bell, 441 U.S. at 533-34 ("We do not doubt
that the Due Process Clause protects a detainee from certain conditions and restrictions of pretrial
detainment.").
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."); Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327 ("[T]he Eighth
Amendment, which is specifically concerned with the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain
in penal institutions, serves as the primary source of substantive protection to convicted prisoners
... where the deliberate use of force is challenged as excessive and unjustified.").
16. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 394 (finding that the Fourth Amendment governs excessive-
force claims arising during initial seizure); Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 (holding that the Due Process
Clause protects pretrial detainees from excessive force).
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detention.' 7 Consequently, a temporal gap has emerged, leaving an arrestee's
constitutional rights uncertain.'
9
This temporal gap is the result of the Court's failure to define when a Fourth
20Amendment seizure ends . Identifying the point in time after an arrest at
which a Fourth Amendment seizure ends would allow courts, plaintiffs, and
law enforcement to know which constitutional rights attach at any given time
during the arrestee's time in custody: the Fourth Amendment would apply to
excessive-force claims arising from conduct during the course of a seizure, and
the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process would apply to excessive-
force claims arising after the seizure has ended.2'
In determining which constitutional right is implicated during this temporal
gap, federal courts have attempted to determine when a seizure ends with
varying results. 22 Some federal courts, like the Ninth Circuit in Torres, have
adopted the "continuing-seizure" rule by holding that a seizure extends beyond
arrest to various points in time before pretrial detention. 23 Other federal courts
17. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10 ("Our cases have not resolved the question whether
the Fourth Amendment continues to provide individuals with protection against the deliberate use
of excessive physical force beyond the point at which arrest ends and pretrial detention begins,
and we do not attempt to answer that question today.").
18. See id; see also Sturgeon, supra note 5, at 133 (noting that the Supreme Court has not
specified how long a seizure extends under the Fourth Amendment).
19. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text; Sturgeon, supra note 5, at 133. Many
plaintiffs have struggled to determine which constitutional right to assert when bringing § 1983
excessive-force claims. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275 (1994) (plurality opinion). In
Albright, the petitioner raised an excessive-force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause, and did not bring the claim under the Fourth Amendment. Id. Writing for the
plurality, Justice Rehnquist explicitly refrained from conducting a Fourth Amendment analysis:
"We express no view as to whether petitioner's claim would succeed under the Fourth
Amendment, since he has not presented that question in his petition for certiorari." Id.
20. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n. 10; see also Sturgeon, supra note 5, at 133.
21. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 394 (recognizing that the Fourth Amendment applies to
seizures); Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 (holding that the Due Process Clause applies to post-seizure,
pretrial excessive force).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that
a "seizure can continue and the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures can
apply beyond" the "moment a suspect is not free to leave"); Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155,
1160 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that a seizure should continue at least until arraignment or a
probable-cause hearing); Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that a
seizure continues until arraignment so long as the arrestee "remains in the custody (sole or joint)
of the arresting officer"). But see, e.g., Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1162 (4th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) (holding that a seizure ends after arrest).
23. See Torres v. Madera, 524 F.3d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir. 2008); Moore v. Novak, 146 F.3d
531, 532-33, 535 (8th Cir. 1998); Johnstone, 107 F.3d at 206-07; Austin, 945 F.2d at 1160;
Powell, 891 F.2d at 1044; McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1306 (6th Cir. 1988); Robins v.
Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Eamonn O'Hagan, Note, Judicial
Illumination of the Constitutional "Twilight Zone": Protecting Post-Arrest, Pretrial Suspects
from Excessive Force at the Hands of Law Enforcement, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1357, 1373 (2003)
(asserting that jurisdictions interpret seizure differently, with some extending seizure beyond the
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have rejected the continuing-seizure rule by holding that seizure ends at24 reut
arrest. As a result, excessive-force claims arising after arrest and before
pretrial detention are analyzed differently depending on how the court defines
a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 2
The disparate treatment of § 1983 excessive-force claims in federal courts
can be remedied by adopting a uniform definition of when a seizure ends.
26
Such a definition would enable federal courts to identify which constitutional
right is implicated by a particular § 1983 claim and apply the appropriate
constitutional analysis, 27 thus providing for the similar treatment of excessive-
force claims across jurisdictions.
The best definition for marking the end of personal seizure is the antithetical
definition of the Court's current personal-seizure definition, which provides
that a seizure occurs "whenever a jolice officer accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away." The antithetical definition operates as a
logical negation of the Court's established personal-seizure definition by
embracing its opposite. Thus, personal seizure would end when the conditions
that gave rise to the seizure-the restraint on an individual's "freedom to walk
away"-no longer exist.29  Adopting the antithetical definition of personal
seizure in evaluating § 1983 excessive-force claims will comport with
initial act of arrest, some extending seizure to the time the suspect remains in custody of the
arresting officer, and some extending seizure to the probable-cause hearing before a judicial
officer).
24. See Riley, 115 F.3d at 1162 (rejecting the "'continuing seizure' theory of the Fourth
Amendment"); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment governed "[c]laims involving the mistreatment of arrestees"); Valencia v.
Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1443-44 (5th Cir. 1993) (refusing to apply the continuing-seizure rule);
Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1989) (rejecting the continuing-seizure
interpretation).
25. Compare Riley, 115 F.3d at 1166 (applying the "excessive force that amounts to
punishment" test under the substantive due process analysis after initial seizure), with Powell, 891
F.2d at 1044 (applying the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test after finding the arrestee's
seizure continued while in custody of the arresting officer). Even federal circuit courts that adopt
the substantive Due Process analysis apply different analytical tests. Brief for The United States
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9-11, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (No.
87-6571) (criticizing the different substantive due process tests adopted by the federal circuit
courts). Compare Valencia, 981 F.2d at 1447 (applying the "maliciously and sadistically for the
very purpose of causing harm" test in analyzing excessive-force claims under the substantive due
process standard), with Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 714 (1987) (finding that the
"shocks the conscience" inquiry governs excessive-force claims arising under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause).
26. See infra Part 111.
27. See Mitchell W. Karsch, Note, Excessive Force and the Fourth Amendment: When Does
Seizure End?, 58 FORDHAm L. REv. 823, 824 (1990) (suggesting that the Supreme Court should
fill the constitutional gap by adopting two bright-line rules to define the end of seizure).
28. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (establishing the Court's personal-seizure
definition).
29. Id
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Supreme Court precedent, provide greater guidance to courts in identifying
what constitutional rights have been violated, and maintain uniform legal
standards throughout the federal-court system.
30
This Comment will determine the appropriate constitutional standard to
govern excessive-force claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which the
alleged misconduct occurred after arrest but before pretrial detention. First,
this Comment will examine the Supreme Court's treatment of excessive-force
claims and demonstrate how a gap has emerged with respect to claims of
excessive force that arise between arrest and pretrial detention. Next, this
Comment will explore the Supreme Court's personal-seizure definition. It then
will analyze how federal courts have defined personal seizure differently in
light of this gap created by the Supreme Court, either by adopting the
continuing-seizure rule or rejecting it. This Comment will suggest that the
rationales underlying the adoption or rejection of the continuing-seizure rule
do not comport with the Supreme Court's excessive-force and personal-seizure
precedents. Finally, this Comment will propose adopting the antithetical
definition of personal seizure, a uniform definition that would provide a
timeline for the termination of seizure that corresponds with the Court's
precedent and treats all arrested persons equally after arrest and before pretrial
detention.
I. ANALYSIS OF § 1983 PRETRIAL EXCESSIVE-FORCE CLAIMS
In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court established a framework for
examining § 1983 excessive-force claims.31  The Court ruled that § 1983
excessive-force claims should not be analyzed under "some generalized
'excessive force' standard," but under the "specific constitutional standard
which governs the right" implicated by the facts and circumstances of the
case. 32  The Court has identified three specific sources of constitutional
30. Cf Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 40 (1994) (noting the importance of
uniformity of law).
31. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). Before Graham, many federal circuit
courts analyzed all excessive-force claims under the four-part test adopted by the Second Circuit
in Johnson v. Glick. See e.g., Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 586-87 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973)). In Johnson, Judge Henry Friendly articulated
the four factors by which all excessive-force claims should be analyzed:
[T]he need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the
amount of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and whether force was
applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.
Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033.
32. Graham, 490 U.S. at 393-94; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533-35 (1979)
(analyzing the plaintiff's claim according to the specific constitutional provision violated).
2010]
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protection governing § 1983 excessive-force claims: the Fourth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.
33
The Fourth Amendment is the constitutional source of protection for
excessive-force claims that arise during the seizure of a person. The Eighth
Amendment is the constitutional source of protection for excessive-force
claims that arise during imprisonment. 35  The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment serves as the constitutional source of protection for
excessive-force claims not arising during personal seizure or imprisonment.
36
Each constitutional provision requires a unique analysis to determine whether
it has been violated by a government agent's use of excessive force.37  To
establish a violation of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the conditions of detention amounted to punishment and that
the officer specifically intended to punish the detainee with excessive force.
38
To establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that
the officer exercised "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain., 39 However,
to establish a Fourth Amendment violation the plaintiff need only demonstrate
33. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 394 (recognizing that the Fourth and Eighth Amendments are
implicated in most excessive-force claims); Bell, 441 U.S. at 534 (finding that the Due Process
Clause is the source of constitutional protection for excessive-force claims that do not violate any
specific provision of the Constitution).
34. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 ("Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual
source of constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive government conduct,
that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' must be the guide
for analyzing these claims."); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (determining
that the Fourth Amendment governs the use of deadly force in effecting the seizure of a person).
35. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1986) ("The Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause 'was designed to protect those convicted of crimes."' (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 664 (1977))).
36. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 n.16 (affirming that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment applies to claims against the federal government). By parity of reasoning, the Bell
majority noted that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause applied to claims against the
states. Id. at 535 n.17. In his dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens noted that the Bell majority had
departed from the Court's prior due process precedent by "mistakenly impl[ying] that the concept
of liberty encompasses only those rights that are either created by statute or regulation or are
protected by an express provision of the Bill of Rights." Id. at 580 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But
see Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (noting that the Supreme Court is
reluctant to expand the applicability of substantive due process).
37. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 (adopting the objective-reasonableness test as the proper
inquiry in evaluating excessive-force claims that violate the Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable seizures); Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 (finding that excessive-force claims arising
under the Eighth Amendment are governed by the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain"
analysis (internal quotation omitted)); Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 (holding that excessive-force claims
arising under the Due Process Clause are examined by looking at whether the conditions amount
to punishment).
38. Bell, 441 U.S. at 535, 538-39.
39. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 (internal quotation omitted).
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that the officer's conduct was not objectively reasonable based on a totality of
the circumstances; it does not require proof of a subjective specific intent.40
Given these principles, the Supreme Court applies a two-part analysis when
evaluating § 1983 excessive-force claims. 41 First, a court must identify what
specific constitutional right is implicated based on the timing of the alleged
misconduct.42 Then, the court must apply the appropriate test governing the
specific constitutional right.43
A. Supreme Court Creates Constitutional Gap in Analyzing § 1983 Excessive-
Force Claims Between Arrest and Pretrial Detention
Although the Supreme Court identified the proper method of inquiry for
evaluating § 1983 excessive-force claims that arise during a person's arrest,44
the Court declined to identify what constitutional right is violated in § 1983
excessive-force claims that arise after arrest and before pretrial detention.
45
However, the Court's excessive-force precedent and seizure precedent offer
insight in deciding which constitutional provisions govern these claims.46
1. The Supreme Court's § 1983 Excessive-Force Claim Precedent
In Bell v. Wolfish and Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court identified the
constitutional provisions that govern § 1983 excessive-force claims arising
during seizure and during pretrial detention, respectively.
47
In Bell, the Court held that the Due Process Clause is the source of
constitutional protection for conditions during pretrial detention. In Bell,several pretrial detainees brought a class-action suit challenging, among other
40. Graham, 490 U.S. at 399 ("[S]ubjective concepts like 'malice' and 'sadism' have no
proper place in that inquiry."). In Graham, the Court elaborated on the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness test, finding that the analysis "requires careful attention to the facts and
circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Id. at 396; see also Al Kamen, Curb on
Inmate Reading Matter Upheld; Supreme Court Also Backs Prohibition of Certain Visitors,
WASH. POST, May 16, 1989, at A4 (noting that Graham only was required to prove that the police
acted unreasonably under the Fourth Amendment).
41. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394.
42. Id. The court must first decide whether the Fourth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment
right is implicated. See id. at 393-94.
43. Id. at 395.
44. Id. at 394-95.
45. Id. at 395 n.10.
46. See infra Part I.A.1, 2.
47. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 394-95 (identifying the Fourth Amendment as governing
excessive-force claims that arise during "an arrest or investigatory stop"); Bell, 441 U.S. at 535
(identifying the Due Process Clause as governing excessive-force claims that arise during pretrial
detention).
48. Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 ("[U]nder the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished
before an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.").
2010]
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things, the "double-bunking" conditions at the Metropolitan Correctional
Center in New York City as a violation of the Due Process Clause.49 The
Court reasoned that the Due Process Clause governed the double-bunking
conditions because the inmates' claim "implicate[d] only the protection against
deprivation of liberty without due process of law," and no other constitutional
provision addressed the conditions of pretrial detention.
50
In Graham, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment is the source of
constitutional protection for excessive-force claims arising during an "arrest,
investigatory stop, or other seizure of a free citizen." 51 In Graham, a police
officer conducted an investigative stop of a vehicle in which Graham was
traveling as a passenger, after observing Graham behave erratically outside a
convenience store.52  When the officer approached the vehicle, the driver
informed him that Graham was in diabetic shock and needed medical
attention. 53 The officer called for police backup, and when those officers
arrived, they too ignored Graham's pleading for medical assistance and,
instead, rammed his face onto the hood of the police vehicle and threw him
into the police vehicle headfirst. 54  The Court reasoned that the officers'
conduct implicated Graham's Fourth Amendment rights because the alleged
excessive force was used during the course of an investigatory stop.55 The
Court ultimately held, more broadly, that the Fourth Amendment governs
excessive-force claims arising during any type of personal seizure.
56
Thus, the appropriate source of constitutional protection for § 1983
excessive-force claims arising after arrest and before pretrial detention turns on
whether a person continues to be "seized" after the initial arrest, investigatory
stop, or other seizure. 57 If an individual remains "seized" after arrest, then the
Fourth Amendment is the applicable source of constitutional protection.
58
Conversely, if an individual is not "seized" after arrest, then Bell suggests that
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause is the appropriate source of
constitutional protection. 59 Thus, the Court's § 1983 precedent indicates that
excessive-force claims arising after arrest and before pretrial detention are
49. Id. at 523-41. The inmates in Bell complained that "double-bunking"-housing two
inmates in a cell originally designed to hold only one-constituted a violation of their due process
rights. Id. at 541.
50. See id at 535 n.16. Other constitutional provisions, such as the Eighth Amendment,
attach only after the conviction and sentencing. Id.
51. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394-95.
52. Id. at 389.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 394.
56. Id at 388, 394-95.
57. See id. at 394-95 & n.10.
58. See id at 394-95.
59. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 & n.16 (1979).
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governed by either the Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause.
Justice v. Dennis provides an interesting example of the difficulty of
distinguishing "seizure" from pretrial detention, and how the Supreme Court
might resolve this issue. After the Court decided Graham, it granted certiorari
in Justice v. Dennis, in which the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, applied the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to determine whether the force
used by an officer after the suspect appeared before a magistrate was
excessive. 61 Following Graham, the Court vacated and remanded Justice to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to be decided in
accordance with Graham,62 thus suggesting Justice was "seized" when the
incident occurred.
2. Supreme Court's Personal-Seizure Precedent
The Court's personal-seizure precedent also provides guidance in
ascertaining which constitutional right is implicated in 1983 excessive-force
claims arising after arrest and before pretrial detention. In Terry v. Ohio, the
Court expansively defined personal seizure, concluding that a person is seized
"when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen." 64 The Court reasoned that where
a police officer frisked a person's outer clothing, even though the person was
60. Justice v. Dennis, 490 U.S. 1087, 1087 (1989) (granting certiorari).
61. Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 381 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc), vacated, 490 U.S. 1087
(1989). The Fourth Circuit held that a substantive due process claim requires the jury "to
consider whether the force 'shocks the conscience' and appears to have been applied 'maliciously
and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm."' Id. at 383 (quoting Bailey v. Turner, 736 F.2d
963, 970 (4th Cir. 1984)). In his dissent, Judge James Dickson Phillips Jr. strongly opposed the
majority's application of the substantive due process analysis to the plaintiffs excessive-force
claim arising after his arrest, but while he was in custody of the arresting officers:
It would be a strange doctrinal twist indeed that treated as "seizures" the limiting
intrusions, without any use of physical force, that are routinely now considered "Terry
stops," but did not treat as a "seizure" the direct use of physical force in subduing a
person in custody just because his "arrest" had already been effected. I am satisfied
that it is a twist not present in controlling fourth amendment doctrine.
Id. at 388 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
62. Justice, 490 U.S. at 1087 (1989) ("The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for further consideration in light of
Graham v. Connor.").
63. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (elaborating on the
conditions of seizure established in Terry); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (expanding on
the Court's conception of personal seizure).
64. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16 (recognizing that an individual may be seized during an
investigatory stop); see also R. Wilson Freyermuth, Comment, Rethinking Excessive Force, 1987
DUKE L.J. 692, 698-99 ("Terry states a broad notion of what constitutes a seizure-one that
compels the conclusion that 'any application of physical force to a citizen which has the effect of
disabling him physically to any extent' is a seizure." (quoting Justice, 834 F.2d at 388 (Phillips,
J., dissenting))).
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not under arrest, the "stop" constituted a seizure because once the police
accosted the individual he was no longer free to leave.65 Terry dramatically
expanded the scope of personal seizure by holding that a person may be seized
without the existence of probable cause.
In expanding the definition of personal seizure, the Court highlighted the
advantage of a flexible definition over a rigid one, noting that "a rigid all-or-
nothing model of justification and regulation under the [Fourth] Amendment
• . .obscures the utility of the limitations upon the scope, as well as the
initiation, of police action as a means of constitutional regulation." 67  The
Court further noted that a flexible definition provides Fourth Amendment
protections against the full range of personal invasions.
68
The Supreme Court has elaborated on the two types of personal seizure:
restraint by physical force,69 and restraint by submission to a show of
authority.
70
a. Restraint by Physical Force
The Supreme Court has held, in several cases, that restraint by physical force
constitutes a seizure. 71 Thus, an individual is seized when law enforcement
intentionally applies physical force to the individual, such as tackling a fleeing
suspect.7
65. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16; see also Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985) (noting that
the Fourth Amendment applies "when the police, without probable cause or a warrant, forcibly
remove a person from his home or other place in which he is entitled to be and transport him to
the police station, where he is detained, although briefly, for investigative purposes").
66. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-22, 30-31 ("We therefore reject the notions that the Fourth
Amendment does not come into play at all as a limitation upon police conduct if the officers stop
short of something called a 'technical arrest' or a 'full-blown search."'); see also Richard W.
Zahn, Comment, California v. Hodari D.: An Evolving Definition of Seizure under the Fourth
Amendment, 27 NEW ENG. L. REv. 447, 452 (1992) (noting that Terry vastly expanded the
conception of personal seizure). Before Terry, a person could not be seized without probable
cause. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979).
67. Terry, 392 U.S. at 17.
68. Id. at 19; see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985); Dunaway, 442 U.S. at
212; DEL CARMEN, supra note 7, at 140 (noting that the Fourth Amendment also extends to stop
and frisk, border searches, and roadblocks).
69. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16 (characterizing a restraint by physical force as seizure).
70. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991) (acknowledging that personal
seizure occurs when law enforcement intentionally terminates freedom of movement); Brower v.
County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (finding that personal seizure encompasses law
enforcement's affirmative actions to prevent escape); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
554 (1980) (concluding that a person is seized if a reasonable person would believe he was not
free to leave based on a totality of the circumstances).
71. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 629; Brower, 489 U.S. at 596-97; Garner, 471 U.S. at 7;
Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 212.
72. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 629.
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When an individual is arrested and taken to the station house, the individual
remains restrained by physical force.73  Additionally, an individual is
restrained by physical force, and therefore seized, when law enforcement
intentionally prevents a person from moving freely by placing a barrier in the
individual's escape route. 74 In Brower v. County ofInyo, the Court held that a
suspect driving a stolen vehicle was seized when the government stopped the
suspect by intentionally placing an eighteen-wheel truck across the highway.75
The Brower Court commented that whether an individual is seized depends on
whether the "governmental termination of freedom of movement" was
achieved "through means intentionally applied.,
76
Law enforcement's use of deadly force against an individual also constitutes
77restraint by physical force. In Tennessee v. Garner, the Court held that a
burglary suspect was seized by a police officer when the police officer fatally
wounded the fleeing suspect with a gunshot.78 These cases clearly show that
79the Court has accepted that restraint by physical force constitutes a seizure.
b. Submission to a Show ofAuthority
The Court also has held that submission to a show of authority constitutes a
seizure. 80 In United States v. Mendenhall, Justices Potter Stewart and William
Rehnquist applied an objective test to determine whether an individual has
submitted to a show of authority. 81 The Court in Hodari D., adopting the
objective test laid out by Justice Stewart in Mendenhall, held that an individual
submits to a show of authority, and is therefore seized, "only if, in view of all
the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave. ' 82 The Court also provided several
73. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 212-14.
74. See Brower, 489 U.S. at 597-99.
75. Id. at 394, 399; see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007) (holding that the
plaintiff was seized when the police officer rammed the plaintiffs car bumper during a car
chase).
76. See Brower, 489 U.S. at 597. An individual is not seized when fleeing from law
enforcement. See id. However, once law enforcement intentionally terminates the individual's
escape, the individual is seized because he no longer possesses freedom of movement. See id. at
396-97.
77. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
78. Id. at 3-4.
79. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991); Brower, 489 U.S. at 597;
Garner, 471 U.S. at 7; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979).
80. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., opinion); cf
Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 625-26 (holding that the suspect was not seized by show of authority
when the suspect did not submit); Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567, 575 (1988) (holding that
the mere presence of police, without more, is not a show of authority sufficient to procure a
seizure).
81. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554; see also Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627-28 (affirming the use
of the Mendenhall objective test for demonstrating submission to a show of authority).
82. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627-28 (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554).
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examples that objectively demonstrate a valid show of authority by police,
including "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon
by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of
language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request
might be compelled. 83
There is no seizure, however, if the suspect does not submit to a show of
authority. 84 Nor is a person seized when he or she is free to walk away or
voluntarily acquiesces to law enforcement. 85 A person does not submit to a
show of authority, and thus is not seized, when fleeing from law
enforcement. 86  In California v. Hodari D., the Court found that cocaine
dropped by the fleeing defendant did not constitute the fruit of a seizure
because the defendant was not seized when he dropped the cocaine, given that
he was running from the police.87 In sum, submission to a show of authority
requires either that the police restrict a suspect's freedom of movement, or that
the suspect relinquish this freedom of movement at the insistence of police.
88
Moreover, the Court has held that where a police officer's treatment of a
suspect is "indistinguishable from a traditional arrest," the suspect has been
seized even though he has not been arrested formally and has not submitted to
force or show of authority.89 For example, in Dunaway v. New York, the Court
found that the plaintiff in a § 1983 suit was seized when law enforcement
drove the plaintiff to the police station, placed him in an interrogation room,
and never told him he was free to leave.90  In a concurrence to Albright v.
83. Id.
84. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 629; Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
85. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554-55 (noting that an individual's ability to walk away freely
does not depend upon law enforcement informing the individual of the ability to walk away); see
also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 204 (2002) (finding no seizure of bus occupants by
police officers when "[t]here was no application of force, no intimidating movements, no
overwhelming show of force, no brandishing of weapons, no blocking of exits, no threat, no
command, not even an authoritative tone of voice").
86. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626 ("It does not remotely apply, however, to the prospect of a
policeman yelling 'Stop, in the name of the law!' at a fleeing form that continues to flee. That is
no seizure."); see also Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 575 (1988) (holding that the suspect
was not seized by police officers when the suspect fled from the police vehicle driving parallel to
him). In Chesternut, the Court suggested that the packets of cocaine abandoned by the suspect
before the suspect was apprehended by the police officers did not constitute the fruits of an
unlawful seizure because the suspect was not seized by the police officers at the time the
controlled substance was discarded. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 575-76.
87. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 625-26. In Hodari D., the Court suggested that law
enforcement's efforts to pursue a fleeing suspect amounts to an attempted seizure at most. See id
at 626 n.2.
88. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628; Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554; Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200 (1979). Richard Zahn strongly criticized the Supreme Court's expansion of seizure in
Hodari D. because it improperly "shifts the Fourth Amendment focus from the government's
action to the citizen's reaction." Zahn, supra note 66, at 449.
89. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 212.
90. Id. at212-13.
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Oliver, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg used the submission-to-a-show-of-
authority rationale to suggest that a defendant released from post-arrest,
pretrial custody remains seized under the Fourth Amendment, stating that
[s]uch a defendant is scarcely at liberty; he remains apprehended,
arrested in his movements, indeed "seized" for trial, so long as he is
bound to appear in court and answer the state's charges. He is
equally bound to appear, and is hence "seized" for trial, when the
state employs the less strong-arm means of a summons in lieu of
arrest to secure his presence in court.
9 1
However, this view of personal seizure in the excessive-force context has not
been adopted by the entire Court,92 and has been rejected affirmatively by
some lower courts.
93
As illustrated above, both the Court's § 1983 excessive-force claim
precedent, 94 and personal-seizure precedent 95 provide useful background in
determining which constitutional right governs § 1983 excessive-force claims
arising after arrest and before pretrial detention. The Court's § 1983
excessive-force claim precedent requires courts to identify either the Fourth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as the source
of constitutional protection.96 Further, the Court's personal-seizure precedent
has elaborated on the timeline of the Fourth Amendment's protections,
91. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 279 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
92. See Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 915 (10th Cir. 2007); Trafton v. Devlin, 43 F. Supp.
2d 56, 63 (D. Me. 1999) (observing that the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of
whether a person on pretrial release is seized under the Fourth Amendment).
93. See DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 603 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding that
pretrial restrictions are not governed by the Fourth Amendment); Kingsland v. City of Miami,
382 F.3d 1220, 1236 (1 lth Cir. 2004) ("[W]e cannot go so far as to say that the conditions of her
pretrial release-which did not constitute a significant deprivation of liberty-constituted a
seizure violative of the Fourth Amendment."); Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1162-64 (4th Cir.
1997) (en banc) (refusing to adopt the doctrine of continuing seizure). But see Gallo v. City of
Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that a person who is required to post
bond, meet with pretrial services, remain within the jurisdiction, and attend hearings is seized
under the Fourth Amendment); Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 945-46 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding
that a defendant who is required to attend eight court dates and remain within the state is seized
under the Fourth Amendment).
94. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (recognizing Fourth Amendment
protections in excessive-force claims arising during arrests or investigatory stops); Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979) (interpreting the protections provided by the Due Process
Clause in excessive-force claims).
95. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489
U.S. 593, 597 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985); United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., opinion); Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 212; Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 20 n.16 (1968).
96. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 394 (ruling that the Fourth Amendment governs excessive-
force claims arising during personal seizures, arrests, or investigatory stops); Bell, 441 U.S. at
534-35 (finding that the Due Process Clause is the source of constitutional protection for
excessive-force claims arising during pretrial detention).
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distinguishing the scope of Fourth Amendment protections from Fourteenth
Amendment protections.
97
B. Federal Courts Respond to the Supreme Court Gap in Analyzing § 1983
Excessive-Force Claims
The lower federal courts have responded to the constitutional gap left by the
Supreme Court concerning § 1983 excessive-force claims that arise between
arrest and pretrial detention by identifying when seizure ends. For example,
some federal courts have adopted the continuing-seizure rule-that suspects
remain seized for Fourth Amendment purposes from the time of their arrest to
some fixed point in the future, ranging from the point at which the arresting
officer relinquishes custody to the suspect's first probable-cause hearing.
9
These federal courts analyze § 1983 excessive-force claims that fall in the gap
under the Fourth Amendment.'
00
Other federal courts have rejected the continuing-seizure rule and hold that a
seizure ends at arrest.10 1 These federal courts analyze § 1983 excessive-force
claims that fall in the gap under the Fourteenth Amendment, iven that the
Fourth Amendment does not apply in the absence of a seizure.10 In adopting
different definitions for when personal seizure ends, federal courts have
applied different constitutional analyses to § 1983 excessive-force claims
arising after arrest and before pretrial detention, resulting in the disparate
treatment of § 1983 excessive-force claims in different jurisdictions.!0 3
97. See supra Part I.A.2.
98. Compare Moore v. Novak, 146 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1998) (implementing the
continuing-seizure rule to accommodate the constitutional gap), and United States v. Johnstone,
107 F.3d 200, 206 (3d Cir. 1997) (adopting the continuing-seizure rule to extend Fourth
Amendment protections), with Riley, 115 F.3d at 1162 (refusing to adopt "continuing seizure" for
post-arrest detainees), and Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1989) (declining to extend
the scope of personal seizure beyond arrest).
99. See, e.g., Moore, 146 F.3d at 535 (applying the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
standard to excessive-force claims arising from the suspect's post-arrest confinement); Johnstone,
107 F.3d at 206-07 (suggesting that seizure may continue after arrest, but declining to specify
when it ends); Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1160 (10th Cir. 1991) (suggesting that seizure
ends with the probable-cause hearing); Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989)
(holding that seizure persists so long as the suspect is in custody of arresting officer); McDowell
v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1306 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that seizure persists while the suspect is
in the custody of the arresting officer); Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985)
(holding that seizure persists during transfer of custody).
100. See, e.g., Moore, 146 F.3d at 535; Johnstone, 107 F.3d at 204-05; Austin, 945 F.2d at
1160; Powell, 891 F.2d at 1044; McDowell, 863 F.2d at 1306; Robins, 773 F.2d at 1010.
101. See, e.g., Riley, 115 F.3d at 1162; Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11 th Cir.
1996); Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1443-44 (5th Cir. 1993); Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 193-
94.
102. See, e.g., Riley, 115 F.3d at 1162; Cottrell, 85 F.3d at 1490; Valencia, 981 F.2d at 1443-
44; Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 193-94.
103. Compare supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text, with supra notes 101-02 and
accompanying text. See also Bradley M. Campbell, Comment, Excessive Force Claims:
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1. Federal Courts Adopting Continuing-Seizure Rule
The United States Courts of Appeal for the Second,' °4 Third,"0 5 Sixth,1"6
Eighth,10 7 Ninth,"' and Tenth' ° 9 Circuits have adopted the continuing-seizure
rule, holding that Fourth Amendment seizure continues beyond the point of
arrest. However, these circuits differ in their approaches to the continuing-
seizure rule and have established different fixed points in time for when
personal seizure ends.
110
a. Seizure Extends until Transfer of Custody
The Second,"' Sixth,'l2 and Ninth 113 Circuits apply the continuing-seizure
doctrine until the arrestee is no longer in the custody of the arresting officer.
In Powell v. Gardner, the Second Circuit held that the continuing-seizure rule
"probably should be applied at least to the period before the time when the
person arrested is arraigned or formally charged and remains in the custody
(sole or joint) of the arresting officer."' 114 In Powell, the plaintiff was assaulted
after he was arrested, booked, and his bail was set.115 The court reasoned that
Powell was seized when the alleged assault occurred in the squad room at the
police station, at least in part because he was in the custody of the arresting
officers at the time. 6
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit applies the continuing-seizure rule while the
arrestee remains in the custody of the arresting officer. 117 In Robins v. Harum,
the plaintiffs were assaulted after their arrest as they were being transported to
Removing the Double Standard, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1369, 1397-98 (1986) (suggesting that the
arrestees' due process rights are implicated after initial arrest, but proposing that the Due Process
analysis adopt the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard); Sturgeon, supra note 5, at 133-
34 (observing that some federal circuit courts rely on Bell and refuse to extend seizure beyond
arrest and other federal circuit courts rely on Graham to extend seizure beyond arrest).
104. Powell, 891 F.2d at 1044.
105. Johnstone, 107 F.3d at 205-06.
106. McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1306 (6th Cir. 1988).
107. Moore v. Novak, 146 F.3d 531, 534-35 (8th Cir. 1998).
108. Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985).
109. Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1160 (10th Cir. 1991).
110. See, e.g., Moore, 146 F.3d at 535; Johnstone, 107 F.3d at 205-06; Austin, 945 F.2d at
1160; Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989); McDowell, 863 F.2d at 1306;
Robins, 773 F.2d at 1010; see also Sturgeon, supra note 5, at 133-34.
111. Powell, 891 F.2d at 1044.
112. McDowell, 863 F.2d at 1306.
113. Robins, 773 F.2d at 1010.
114. Powell, 891 F.2d at 1044 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 395 n.10
(1989)).
115. Id. at 1041-42.
116. Id at 1042, 1044.
117. Robins, 773 F.2d at 1010.
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the police station."1 8 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the plaintiffs were seized
while en route to the police station because the arresting officer was present
and had restrained the plaintiffs' freedom to walk away. "9 The Sixth Circuit,
in McDowell v. Rogers, also adopted the continuing-seizure rule, holding that
McDowell was seized "throughout the time [he was] in the custody of the
arresting officer."'
120
Thus, the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits all construe the continuing-
seizure rule to apply at least until the time the arrestee is transferred from the
custody of the arresting officer.
b. Seizure Extends through the Booking Process
The Eighth Circuit has adopted the continuing-seizure rule, extending
personal seizure through the booking process.' 2' In Moore v. Novak, police
officers used a stun gun to calm Moore after he became verbally irate and
physically abusive during the booking process. 122 The district court applied
the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" test to Moore's
excessive-force claim. 123  The Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's
application of the Fourth Amendment standard, finding that Moore was seized
when police officers applied force to Moore during the booking process. 1
24
c. Seizure Extends until a Probable-Cause Hearing Is Held
The Tenth Circuit has espoused an even broader view of the continuing-
seizure rule in the limited context of warrantless arrests, holding that personal
seizure continues until a probable-cause hearing is held. 25  In Austin v.
Hamilton, the plaintiffs were cited for possession of marijuana, handcuffed,
and taken to the port of entry where they were assaulted by law-enforcement
officers, finally being released after twelve hours. 126  The Tenth Circuit
reasoned that the plaintiffs' seizure extended until the probable-cause hearing
because the plaintiffs were entitled to Fourth Amendment protections until a
judicial officer made a finding of probable cause to support the warrantless
arrest. 1
27
In Pierce v. Multnomah County, the Ninth Circuit endorsed the Tenth
Circuit's reasoning and also held that a seizure may continue to the probable-
118. Id. at 1006.
119. Id at 1009-10 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985)).
120. McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1306 (1988) (citing Robins, 773 F.2d at 1010).
121. See Moore v. Novak, 146 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1998).
122. Id. at 533.
123. Id. at 535.
124. Id. at 535-36.
125. Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1160 (10th Cir. 1991).
126. Id. at 1157.
127. Id. at 1160.
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cause hearing or release, in the case of a warrantless arrest. 128 Thus, in both
the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, a suspect that is arrested without a warrant is
considered seized for Fourth Amendment purposes until a probable-cause
hearing can be held, greatly extending the reach of the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness test.
Several federal circuit courts have adopted the continuing-seizure rule to
extend seizure to various points beyond arrest.' 29 These points include transfer
from custody, booking, and a probable-cause hearing.
130
2. Federal Courts Rejecting the Continuing-Seizure Rule
Conversely, the United States Courts of Appeal for the Fourth,
13  Fifth, 112
Seventh, 133 and Eleventh 134 Circuits have rejected the continuing-seizure rule,
finding that personal seizure ends once a person has been arrested. These
circuit courts have rejected the continuing-seizure rule because they have
concluded that the text of the Fourth Amendment, and its underlying rationale,
do not support expanding its protections beyond arrest. 135 In Riley v. Dorton,
the Fourth Circuit justified limiting personal seizure to the point of arrest
because the Fourth Amendment concerns "the initial decision to detain an
accused," and nothing more.136 The court reasoned that Fourth Amendment
protections did not govern an assault on the plaintiff at the police station three-
and-a-half hours after arrest because the Fourth Amendment's Yprotections only
apply to the initial arrest, and not to the subsequent detention.
128. Pierce v. Multnomah County, 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996). In Pierce, the
plaintiff was assaulted at the jail after being detained for four hours following the issuance of a
citation. Id. at 1036.
129. See, e.g., Moore v. Novak, 146 F.3d 531, 533-35 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1997); Austin, 945 F.2d at 1160; Powell v. Gardner,
891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989); McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1306 (6th Cir. 1988);
Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985).
130. See, e.g., Moore, 146 F.3d at 533-35 (extending seizure throughout the booking
process); Austin, 945 F.2d at 1160 (determining that seizure continues until the probable-cause
hearing); Powell, 891 F.2d at 1044 (finding that seizure lasts while the arrestee is in the custody
of the arresting officer).
131. Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1162 (4th Cir. 1997).
132. Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1443-44 (5th Cir. 1993).
133. Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1989).
134. Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11 th Cir. 1996).
135. See, e.g., Valencia, 981 F.2d at 1443-45; Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 193-94.
136. Riley, 115 F.3d at 1162-63.
137. Id.
The core of this Fourth Amendment jurisprudence thus addresses arrest-what
constitutes an arrest, what constitutes probable cause to make an arrest, when probable
cause must be found by a neutral magistrate, which official may issue a warrant, what
type of information is required to support a valid warrant, and what force may be used
during an arrest.
Id. (internal citations omitted)
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Likewise, in Wilkins v. May, the Seventh Circuit limited the reach of the
Fourth Amendment to "the initial act of seizing."' 3 8 In Wilkins, the plaintiff
accused a police officer of using excessive force during a post-arrest custodial
interrogation in which the officer held a gun to Wilkins's head. 39 The court
reasoned that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the plaintiffs excessive-
force claim because the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable once probable
cause has been established by arrest. 140 The court also was hesitant to expand
seizure beyond arrest because it might result in "an unwarranted expansion of
constitutional law," requiring all police conduct to conform to the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness standard. 141
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit declined to adopt the continuing-seizure rule
because, in its view, the Fourth Amendment protections are no longer relevant
once an individual has been arrested.142  In Valencia v. Wiggins, a pretrial
detainee arrested on drug charges was assaulted by a police officer after the
detainee participated in a jail disturbance. 43 Relying on Bell, the Fifth Circuit
reasoned that the pretrial detainee's excessive-force claim was not governed by
the Fourth Amendment because the Fourth Amendment's probable-cause
requirement and privacy protections do not extend beyond initial arrest.1
44
The Eleventh Circuit also relied on Bell to find that the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause applies to excessive-force claims that arise
after an initial arrest.145 Thus, several federal circuit courts have rejected the
continuing-seizure rule because they conclude, among other things, that the
138. Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 192-93. In Wilkins, the court rejected the continuing-seizure
approach because it feared expanding constitutional law under the Fourth Amendment and
advocated a narrow interpretation of the Fourth Amendment:
There are no obvious limiting principles within the [Fourth A]mendment itself. The
problem is that the concept of continuing seizure attenuates the element that makes
police conduct in the arrest situation problematic: the police are taking away a person's
liberty. Custodial interrogation does not curtail a person's freedom of action; it
presupposes that he has already lost that freedom-for by definition he is already in
custody. We reject the concept of the continuing seizure.
Id. at 194.
139. Id. at 191-92.
140. Id. at 193-94.
141. Id. at 194.
142. Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1443-45 (5th Cir. 1993).
143. Id. at 1442.
144. Id. at 1443-45 ("[ln Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court refused to hold that a pretrial
detainee has a privacy interest in his person that is protected by the Fourth Amendment."). The
Fifth Circuit also justified its conclusion on its finding that an individual's Fourth Amendment
privacy rights are not implicated after arrest, noting that the Fourth Amendment "protects neither
a prisoner's privacy interest in his prison cell nor his possessory interest in personal property
contained in his cell." Id. at 1445 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)).
145. See e.g., Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996). In Cottrell, the
arrestee died after having been restrained and placed in a police vehicle in a position where he
was unable to breathe. Id. at 1488.
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Fourth Amendment is concerned with requiring probable cause for arrest and
is, therefore, inapplicable once an arrest has been effected.
146
As illustrated, a circuit split has developed in defining personal seizure.
147
Thus, § 1983 excessive-force claims arising after arrest and before pretrial
detention receive disparate treatment depending on the jurisdiction in which
the claim is brought.
4 8
Although Supreme Court precedent has offered some guidelines in
evaluating § 1983 excessive-force claims that arise between arrest and pretrial
detention, the guidance is insufficient, particularly with respect to the scope
of personal seizure.'
50
II. THE PERSONAL-SEIZURE APPROACHES ADOPTED BY THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
COURTS ARE INADEQUATE
The Supreme Court's holdings in Graham and Bell led to a circuit split
concerning the scope of personal seizure in § 1983 excessive-force claims. 151
Specifically, circuits are split over whether a seizure for Fourth Amendment
purposes continues past the initial arrest. 15  The circuit courts have provided
different justifications for adopting or rejecting the continuing-seizure
approach. 53  Some circuit courts have interpreted Graham to justify
continuing seizure to a fixed point beyond arrest, ranging from transfer of
custody to the probable-cause hearing. Other circuit courts have refused to
continue seizure beyond arrest because the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness standard is concerned with establishing probable cause for the
initial arrest and does not concern police conduct once probable cause has been
146. See Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1162 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Cottrell, 85 F.3d at
1490; Valencia, 981 F.2d at 1443-44; Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 194.
147. Compare supra Part I.B.1 (discussing circuits that have adopted the continuing-seizure
rule), with supra Part I.B.2 (discussing circuits that have rejected the continuing-seizure rule).
148. See supra Part I.A; see also Sturgeon, supra note 5, at 133-34.
149. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
governs excessive-force claims during personal seizure); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534
(1979) (ruling that the Due Process Clause protects pretrial detainees from excessive force).
150. See supra Part I.B.
151. See supra Part I; see also O'Hagan, supra note 23, at 1366-67 (observing the different
treatment of excessive-force claims under the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause).
152. See supra Part I.
153. Compare United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 205 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that
Graham suggests seizure continues after an individual initially is restrained), and Austin v.
Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1160 (10th Cir. 1991) (adopting the continuing-seizure rule to extend
Fourth Amendment protections to warrantless arrestees), with Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159,
1163 (4th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the continuing-seizure rule and holding that seizure is confined to
a single act), and Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1444 (5th Cir. 1993) (refusing to apply the
continuing-seizure rule because of "weak textual support" in the Fourth Amendment for this
approach).
154. Seesupra Part I.B.1.
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established.1 55  However, the justifications for adopting or rejecting the
continuing-seizure rule fail to account for the Supreme Court's definition of
personal seizure established in Terry.
156
A. Rejecting the Continuing-Seizure Rule Contradicts Supreme Court
Precedent
Circuits that justify rejecting the continuing-seizure rule based on the notion
that the Fourth Amendment only applies to the initial arrest, which must be
based on probable cause,1 57 fail to give credence to the Court's broad
conception of personal seizure.' 58 In Terry, the Court established that personal
seizure does not always require probable cause. 159 The Court emphasized that
investigative stops, which do not require probable cause, are nevertheless
seizures for Fourth Amendment purposes.' Although probable cause is a
condition precedent to a lawful arrest,161 it plays no role in regulating police
conduct during the course of a non-arrest seizure. 162 Thus, the Court clearly
has held in Terry and its progeny that the Fourth Amendment's protection
against unreasonable seizures is not limited to the requirement that all arrests
be based on probable cause. Therefore, the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and
155. See supra Part I.B.2.
156. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 n. 16 (1968) (noting that a person is seized "when [an]
officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of
[that] citizen").
157. See, e.g., Riley, 115 F.3d at 1162; Valencia, 981 F.2d at 1443-44.
158. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979) ("The application of the
Fourth Amendment's requirement of probable cause does not depend on whether an intrusion of
this magnitude is termed an 'arrest' under state law."); Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 (recognizing that an
individual may be seized in the absence of probable cause and without arrest).
159. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16; see also Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics:
Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 401-02 (1988) (criticizing the
Court's expansion of personal seizure in Terry for eroding the probable-cause standard).
160. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. The Court suggested in Terry that the Fourth Amendment offers
citizens greater protection than those protections afforded by probable cause. See Akhil Amar,
Terry and the Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 1097, 1098 (1998).
Professor Akil Amar commented on the expansive view of seizure adopted by the Court in Terry,
noting that the Court "embraced a broad definition of 'searches' and 'seizures,' enabling the
Fourth Amendment to apply to myriad ways in which government might intrude upon citizens'
persons, houses, papers, and effects." Id. Amar also highlighted the limited role probable cause
plays in personal seizures, stating that "Terry did not insist that all warrantless intrusions be
justified by probable cause." Id. Finally, Amar concluded that "reasonableness-not the warrant,
not probable cause-thus emerged as the central Fourth Amendment mandate and touchstone."
Id.
161. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (finding that warrantless searches and
seizures based upon probable cause are valid); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 n.12.
162. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) ("[T]he question is whether the
officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting
them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation."); see also supra notes 159-60.
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Eleventh Circuits are not warranted in using the existence of probable cause
and arrest as restrictions on the Fourth Amendment's protections.
The circuit courts adverse to the continuing-seizure rule neglect to consider,
as a general matter, the Court's expansive definition of personal seizure
adopted in Terry163 and that definition's implementation in Graham and
Dunaway.164 The Terry Court noted that a seizure occurs when an "officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority has in some way restrained the
liberty of a citizen.' 65 Thus, personal seizure could extend beyond the initial
arrest when an individual continues to be restrained beyond the initial arrest. 166
Graham and Dunaway likewise suggest that seizure could extend beyond the
point of arrest. 167 In Graham, the Court implied that the plaintiffs seizure
continued after being handcuffed, thus the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness standard applied to the excessive-force allegations arising "in
the context of an arrest or investigatory stop," but after the initial arrest.' 6 In
Dunaway, the Court suggested that even though the suspect never actually was
arrested, he effectively was arrested, and the plaintiffs seizure continued after
the "arrest" to the point at which he was riding in the police vehicle to the
station and placed in the interrogation room. 69
Furthermore, the Court's decision to remand Justice170 following Graham
suggests that the Court determined that the Fourth Amendment was the
appropriate constitutional standard to apply in Justice.17 1 As in Dunaway, the
163. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16, 19 n.16.
164. Graham, 490 U.S. at 389, 394; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979).
165. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
166. See id. at 16, 19 n.16.
167. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 389, 394-95 (finding that the alleged excessive force used
against the suspect occurred while he was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes after initially
being restrained with handcuffs); Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 212-13 (holding that although the
suspect never was arrested, but was treated as though he had been arrested, seizure continued
beyond the initial "arrest" to the point at which he was "taken from a neighbor's home to a police
car, transported to a police station, and placed in an interrogation room").
168. Graham, 490 U.S. at 389, 394-95.
169. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 212-13. The Dunaway Court quoted its earlier decision in Davis
v. Mississippi, forcefully insisting that
"to argue that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the investigatory stage is
fundamentally to misconceive the purposes of the Fourth Amendment . . . . [T]he
Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal
security of our citizenry, whether the intrusions be termed 'arrests' or 'investigatory
detentions."'
Id. at 214-15 (first alteration in original) (quoting Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-27
(1969)).
170. Justice v. Dennis, 490 U.S. 1087, 1087 (1989) (vacating the judgment and remanding
the case to the Fourth Circuit to be reconsidered in light of Graham).
171. Because the Court remanded Justice, it implicitly suggested that Justice should be
analyzed in accordance with Graham's Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry. See Graham,
490 U.S. at 394. As such, the Court declined to review the substantive due process analysis
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excessive-force claim in Justice arose after the plaintiff had been arrested and
while he was located in the magistrate's office.' 72 Based on these reasons, the
Supreme Court has suggested that seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes
continues after the initial arrest. Therefore, the circuit courts are not justified
in refusing to apply the continuing-seizure rule.
B. Adoption of the Continuing-Seizure Rule Contradicts Supreme Court
Precedent
Jurisdictions that have adopted the continuing-seizure rule 173 neglect to
embrace the Court's expansive definition of personal seizure fully. 174 These
jurisdictions run afoul of the Court's holding in Terry by ending the seizure
period prematurely 75 or by continuing seizure to the probable-cause hearing
for reasons contrary to the Court's personal-seizure precedent.
176
1. Federal Circuit Courts Fail to Embrace the Supreme Court's Definition
of Personal Seizure by Ending Personal Seizure Prematurely
Jurisdictions that have held that seizure continues while the arrestee
"remains in the custody (sole or joint) of the arresting officer" 177 or throughout
the booking process178 do not go far enough in applying the Court's definition
of personal seizure as restraint by physical force.'79 These jurisdictions fail to
recognize that the restraint on an arrestee's freedom of movement continues
applied by the Fourth Circuit in Justice. See Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 382-83 (4th Cir.
1987), vacated and remanded, 490 U.S. 1087 (1989).
172. Justice, 834 F.2d at 383.
173. Moore v. Novak, 146 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Johnstone, 107
F.3d 200, 206 (3d Cir. 1997); Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1160 (10th Cir. 1991); Powell
v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989); McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1306 (6th
Cir. 1988); Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985).
174. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16, 19 n.16; see also supra Part II.A.
175. See, e.g., Moore, 146 F.3d at 535; Johnstone, 107 F.3d at 206; Powell, 891 F.2d at 1044;
McDowell, 863 F.2d at 1306; Robins, 773 F.2d at 1010.
176. See, e.g., Pierce v. Multnomah County, 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that
the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizures applies until the suspect is
released or until the probable-cause hearing is held for those arrested without a warrant); Austin,
945 F.2d at 1160 (finding that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard might apply
until the suspect is released or until a probable-cause hearing is held).
177. Powell, 891 F.2dat 1044; see also, e.g., McDowell, 863 F.2d at 1306.
178. See, e.g., Moore, 146 F.3d at 534-35.
179. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16, 19 n.16.
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after he is transferred from one officer to another' 80 and while he is in a
holding cell at the police station. 181
Justice Stewart's examples of personal seizure identified in Mendenhall
imply that personal seizure extends beyond arrest and the booking process
given that, in both circumstances, "a reasonable person [would believe] that he
[is] not free to leave."' 8 2 In doing so, Justice Stewart noted that a seizure may
occur when a police officer displays a weapon, physically touches the arrestee,
or is threatening the arrestee with his presence or the presence of other officers
after arrest.
83
Curtailing the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard at the point of the
transfer of custody or to the booking process fails to comport with the Court's
personal-seizure precedent because the arrestee remains restrained by physical
force and susceptible to police misconduct. 184 Thus, the Second, 18Third,"'
Sixth, *8  Eighth,"' and Ninth I8  Circuits are not justified in holding that
seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes ends with the transfer of custody or
the booking period. 90
180. See Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1164 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) ("[T]his rule would
have Fourth Amendment coverage depend upon the fortuity of how long an arresting officer
happens to remain with a suspect.").
181. See 2 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 95 (4th ed. 2006) (stating that an arrestee remains restrained after the booking
process until the first appearance before a judicial officer).
182. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., opinion). In
Part II-A, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, further noted that "otherwise inoffensive
contact between a member of the public and the police cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a
seizure of that person." Id. at 555; see also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007)
(noting that the test for seizure was devised by Justice Stewart's opinion in Mendenhall and is
applicable when police are clear in their intent to restrain an individual).
183. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554; see also Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 263 (stating that
Brendlin was seized from the moment the car stopped on the side of the road, even though there
was no formal arrest).
184. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554; see also Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1160 n.3
(10th Cir. 1991) ("[W]e disagree that seizure or arrest effects a pertinent, qualitative alteration in
the justifications for force (an arrestee remains a risk to officers, nearby persons or property and,
as an escape threat, the community at large) ....").
185. Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989).
186. United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1997).
187. McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1306 (6th Cir. 1988).
188. Moore v. Novak, 146 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1998).
189. Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985).
190. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (suggesting that seizure extends beyond
the transfer of custody and the booking period because a person remains restrained by physical
force).
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2. Federal Circuit Courts Fail to Embrace the Supreme Court's Definition
of Personal Seizure by Continuing Seizure Based on Probable-Cause
Justifications
The Ninth' 9' and Tenth'9 2 Circuits' rule that a seizure continues until a
probable-cause hearing is held1 93 also fails because not all seizures require a
probable-cause justification.' 94  A probable-cause determination is an
independent inquiry that plays no role in evaluating a police officer's conduct
during the course of seizure.' 95 Rather, the probable-cause inquir focuses on
a police officer's justifications for making a warrantless seizure, 96 not on the
length of personal seizure once an arrest has been made.
197
The probable-cause justification also treats those arrested with a warrant
differently than those arrested without a warrant, offering additional protection
for those arrested without a warrant even though both arrestees are subjected to
the same excessive force at the same point during their detention.19 8 Because
191. See Pierce v. Multnomah County, 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996).
192. See Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1160(10th Cir. 1991).
193. See, e.g., Pierce, 76 F.3d at 1043. The Tenth Circuit, in Austin, agreed:
We conclude that just as the fourth amendment's strictures continue in effect to set the
applicable constitutional limitations regarding both duration (reasonable period under
the circumstances of arrest) and legal justification (judicial determination of probable
cause), its protections also persist to impose restrictions on the treatment of the arrestee
detained without a warrant.
Austin, 945 F.2d at 1160.
194. Compare Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16 (implying that probable cause is not necessary for
personal seizure), with Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (finding that probable
cause is necessary to make warrantless searches or seizures). In Terry, the Court demonstrated
that seizure ranges from an investigative stop to arrest, stating "lilt is quite plain that the Fourth
Amendment governs 'seizures' of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house
and prosecution for crime-'arrests' in traditional terminology." Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
195. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949) (noting that the probable-cause
standard serves to "safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions"); see also O'Hagan,
supra note 23, at 1387 ("Although a probable cause determination examines the circumstances
surrounding an arrest, that does not explain why, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, the act of
detaining an individual without such a hearing, days after an arrest, is itself an independent
violation of the Fourth Amendment.").
196. See Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175-76 (observing that the probable-cause inquiry concerns
whether a police officer believes an individual has committed or is committing a criminal
offense).
197. The Seventh Circuit, in Wilkins, noted that
cases which hold that the Fourth Amendment places limits on the length of time an
arrested person may be held before being brought before a magistrate, are not
controlling either. They are interpretations of the Fourth Amendment's requirement of
probable cause; they do not hold or imply that every moment of detention is a fresh
seizure.
Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 193 (7th Cir. 1989).
198. See Karsch, supra note 27, at 824 (arguing that the probable-cause hearing operates as a
bright-line rule in defining the end of seizure for warrantless arrestees and that the initial
appearance operates as a bright-line rule in defining the end of seizure for warrant arrestees).
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the probable-cause standard would create an unjustified disparity in the
treatment of the same excessive-force claim brought by warrant arrestees and
warrantless arrestees, the continuing-seizure rule cannot extend to the
probable-cause hearing based on the reasoning offered by the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits.
As demonstrated, the federal circuit courts that apply the continuing-seizure
rule fail to adhere to the Court's expansive definition of personal seizure by
either ending personal seizure prematurely 199 or by extending seizure to the
probable-cause hearing based on a narrow interpretation of the Fourth
200Amendment. As a result, none of the rationales advocated by the federal
circuit courts for rejecting or adopting the continuing-seizure rule properly can
govern the treatment of § 1983 excessive-force claims arising after initial arrest
and before pretrial detention.
11. A NEW APPROACH TO PERSONAL SEIZURE
A uniform application of federal law is essential to the legitimacy of the
judicial system as a whole.20 1 Citizens will be inclined to follow and respect
the law when the law treats similar offenses in a similar manner.20 2 Uniformity
Karsch's attempt to reconcile the treatment ofwarrantless arrestees and warrant arrestees suggests
that the probable-cause standard is unsuitable in defining the end of personal seizure because, as
Karsch admits, the time at which a warrant arrestee makes an appearance before a judicial officer
could vary significantly case to case. See id at 840. Karsch offers nothing to suggest that the
timing of a warrant arrestee's first appearance and a warrantless arrestee's probable-cause hearing
typically would occur at roughly the same time. Id. Similarly, in his article, O'Hagan suggests
terminating personal seizure at the probable-cause hearing. O'Hagan, supra note 23, at 1392-93.
However, unlike Karsch, O'Hagan's approach even fails to account for how individuals arrested
with a valid warrant should be treated. See id Therefore, this approach fails to solve the problem
of disparate treatment discussed above.
199. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., opinion) (noting
that a person may be seized by the threatening presence of police officers, the displaying of a
weapon, or by physical touching); Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
200. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
201. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816) (noting the
"necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within
the purview of the constitution" and highlighting that "[t]he public mischiefs that would attend
such a state of [lack of uniformity] would be truly deplorable"); see also Caminker, supra note
30, at 40 ("[P]erceived legitimacy endures so long as the judiciary is seen as laboring to ground
its decisions in legal principle. Uniform interpretation of federal law throughout the land helps
preserve this perception."). Uniformity of law also played an integral role in the framing of the
Constitution itself: "A perfect uniformity must be observed thro' the whole union or jealousy and
unrighteousness will take place; and for a uniformity one judiciary must pervade the whole." A
Landholder V, CONNECTICUT COURANT, Dec. 3, 1787, reprinted in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 334-38 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J.
Saladino eds., 1983).
202. See Caminker, supra note 30, at 39 ("[G]eographical variances in the application of a
uniform rule caused by divergent judicial interpretations seems both irrational and unfair."); see
also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional
Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1731, 1812-13 & n.451 (1991) ("But even an intercircuit split
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in the application of federal law also allows for predictability, better enabling
individuals both to conform their conduct to the standards required by law and
to understand the penalties for violating the law.2 °3 Predictability also
enhances the execution of the laws by providing clear and unambiguous
guidance to law-enforcement officers.
204
Given the importance of uniformity of law, the federal circuit courts should
adopt a uniform standard for defining the end of personal seizure20 5 that
accounts for the Supreme Court's § 1983 excessive-force claim precedent, 20 6
as well as its flexible and expansive personal-seizure precedent. 0  Adopting a
uniform definition for the end of personal seizure will provide clearer guidance
to the federal courts for analyzing § 1983 excessive-force claims that arise
after arrest and before pretrial detention, and eliminate the disparate treatment
among plaintiffs bringing such claims.
20 8
A. Adopting the Antithetical Definition of Personal Seizure
The best way to define the end of personal seizure, consistent with the
Court's personal-seizure precedent, is using the antithesis of the Court's
definition of personal seizure209-that is, personal seizure must end when
jeopardizes the ideal of integrity or consistency, because we do have a single federal judicial
system in which uniformity is a prominent aspiration.").
203. Caminker, supra note 30, at 38 ("Predictability ...better enables individuals to rely
justifiably on particular legal rules when they order their affairs.").
204. Id. at 39 (recognizing that uniform implementation of federal laws better enables the
executive branch to enforce the law).
205. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979) ("A single, familiar standard
is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and
balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.");
see also Anthony J. Bellia, State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 VAND. L.
REV. 1501, 1553 (2006) ("The Supremacy Clause's characterization of federal law as the
'supreme Law of the Land,' fairly implies that at an appropriate level of generality federal law
should have a uniform meaning in any state or federal court." (internal citations omitted)).
206. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (referencing the scope of Fourth
Amendment protections); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (discussing Due Process
Clause protections); see also supra Part I.A. 1.
207. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991) (adopting the definition of
personal seizure advocated by Justice Stewart in Mendenhall by stating that a person is seized if a
reasonable person would believe he was not free to leave based on a totality of the
circumstances); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968) (suggesting that the Fourth Amendment
requires a flexible standard in governing police conduct).
208. See O'Hagan, supra note 23, at 1359 ("This controversy has significance beyond issues
of mere constitutional interpretation because a plaintiff's burden of proof and likelihood of
securing a favorable verdict are significantly influenced by which constitutional standard governs
his or her claim.").
209. See Alfred H. Lloyd, The Logic ofAntithesis, 8 PHIL. PSYCHOL. SCI. METHODs 281, 283
(1911) (suggesting that an antithetical definition provides "complete exclusion" from the first
definition); see also David Gary Carlson, Hegel's Theory of Quantity, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
2027, 2086 (2002) (demonstrating how Kant invoked the antithesis in proving his thesis).
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restraint by physical force no longer exists or when a reasonable person no
longer would submit to a show of authority based on a totality of the
circumstances.
210
1. Antithetical Definition of Personal Seizure Comports with Supreme Court
Precedent
The antithetical definition of personal seizure should be adopted because it
comports with the Court's treatment of § 1983 excessive-force claims in
Graham211 and Bell.212  The antithetical definition of personal seizure also
should be implemented because it advances the Court's expansive and flexible
approach to personal seizure advocated in Terry213 and maintains the
objectivity articulated by Justice Stewart in Mendenhall.214
a. Antithetical Definition of Personal Seizure Complies with Graham and
Bell
The antithetical definition adheres to the Court's precedent in Graham and
Bell because it recognizes that seizure extends beyond the initial point of arrest
or investigative stop as in Graham,215 and also accounts for seizure ending
before the commencement of pretrial detention as articulated in Bell.2 16 The
antithetical definition of personal seizure follows Graham because the suspect
210. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980) (Stewart, J., opinion);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968); see also Lloyd, supra note 209, at 281 (demonstrating
how the antithetical approach operates). Aristotle also was a strong supporter of the antithetical
concept:
When the style is . . . antithetical, in each of the two members . . . an opposite is
balanced by an opposite .... This kind of style is pleasing, because things are best
known by opposition, and are all the better known when the opposites are put side by
side; and is pleasing also because of its resemblance to logic-for the method of
refutation... is the juxtaposition of contrary conclusions.
ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE 204-05 (Lane Cooper trans., 1932); see also Michael
Frost, Justice Scalia's Rhetoric of Dissent: A Greco-Roman Analysis of Scalia's Advocacy in the
VMI Case, 91 KY. L.J. 167, 214 (1994) ("[T]he more concise and antithetical the saying, the
better it pleases, for the reason that, by the contrast, one learns the more, and, by the conciseness,
learns with the greater speed." (quoting ARISTOTLE, supra, at 214)).
211. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 389, 393-95 (1989); see also supra Part I.A.
212. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-37 (1979); see also supra Part II.A.
213. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17.
214. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
215. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 389, 394. Other Supreme Court cases also have implemented
the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis after a suspect was in the custody of the arresting
officer. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 755, 766-67 (1985) (applying a Fourth Amendment
reasonableness analysis after police officers placed a suspect in custody and forced the suspect to
undergo surgery to remove a bullet as evidence of a crime); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 758-59, 767-68 (1966) (applying a Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis in
evaluating the police officer's conduct when he forced a suspect to submit to a blood test at the
hospital following an automobile accident).
216. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 523, 534-35.
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in that case no longer was submitting to a show of authority or restrained by
physical force once released by the police officers. 217  The antithetical
definition of personal seizure is also consistent with Bell because the pretrial
detainees no longer were seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment given
that their legal status had changed from "seized" to "defendants" after being
afforded the first legal opportunity for release at an appearance before a
218judicial officer. In Bell, while the Court had the option to extend seizure to
the pretrial detainee and invoke a Fourth Amendment analysis, it decided
instead to analyze the claims under the Due Process Clause.219 The Court's
decision to conduct a due process inquiry rather than a Fourth Amendment
analysis suggests that the pretrial detainees were not seized for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court's due process analysis dictates
that pretrial detainees are not seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
220
Thus, the antithetical definition of personal seizure should be implemented
because it is consistent with the Court's treatment of § 1983 excessive-force
claims in Graham and Bell.
b. Antithetical Definition Advances Court's Seizure Precedent
The antithetical definition of personal seizure also complies with the Court's
personal-seizure precedent established in Terry because it offers a flexible
continuum for when personal seizure may end and provides guidance to courts
and law enforcement for determining when seizure ends. 22 Unlike the various
approaches adopted by the federal circuit courts concerning personal seizure,
the antithetical definition of personal seizure does not mark the end of seizure
with a fixed point in time, such as arrest, transfer of custody, the booking
process, or the probable-cause hearing. 22  Rather, the antithetical definition of
personal seizure is flexible because it permits personal seizure to end at various
points in time depending on when the indicia of a seizure no longer exist.223 Inaddition, the antithetical definition comports with Justice Stewart's opinion in
217. Graham, 490 U.S. at 389 (noting that Graham was released after officers learned that
Graham was not involved in criminal conduct); see also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,
628 (1991) (noting that an individual is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that
the officer's words and actions were intended to restrict his freedom of movement).
218. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
219. Bell, 441 U.S. at 535.
220. See id.
221. See supra Part IB; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968).
222. Compare supra Part IB, with supra Part III.A.
223. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 17 (noting that the Fourth Amendment protections arise during
the initial contact between police officers and citizens, and extend through arrest). Personal
seizure may end at arrest, transfer of custody, the booking process, or at the first hearing before a
judicial officer. See also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 n.l 1 (1975) ("The length of pretrial
custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended at any time by release on
recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or a guilty plea, as well as by acquittal or conviction after
trial.").
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Mendenhall because it adopts the same standard of objective reasonableness-
the totality of the circumstances as viewed by a reasonable person.2
2 4
As demonstrated, the antithetical definition of personal seizure adheres to
the Court's personal-seizure precedent because it provides an objective
standard 225 and marks the end of a seizure as the point in time when a seizure
under the rationale of Terry no longer exists.
226
B. Operation of the Antithetical Definition of Personal Seizure
The antithetical definition of personal seizure is appropriate in defining the
end of seizure because it accounts for both restraint by physical force and
submission to a show of authority.
227
1. Antithetical Definition of Personal Seizure Applied to Restraint by
Physical Force and Submission to a Show ofAuthority
If an individual is seized by means of physical force,228 the antithetical
definition provides that the seizure will end once the individual no longer is
restrained by physical force. 229 If an individual is seized by submission to a
show of authority, the antithetical definition of personal seizure provides that
the seizure will end once a reasonable person would no longer submit to a
230show of authority based on a totality of the circumstances. Seizure through
restraint by physical force or submission to a show of authority may end by
either legal or illegal means. Hodari D. demonstrated that one who
escapes from law enforcement no longer is restrained by physical force
because that individual has regained freedom of movement.
233
Conversely, restraint by physical force ends by legal means once the legal
system provides a seized individual with his first opportunity for release.
234
224. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., opinion).
225. See id
226. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16.
227. See id; Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553-54.
228. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16 (articulating the definition of seizure).
229. See Lloyd, supra note 209, at 283 ("Doubtless to ordinary thought an antithesis signifies
two terms that are what I call a single, ungraded, cataclysmic difference, meaning of course a
difference of complete exclusion, a difference under which neither term has any contacts, or any
dealings, with the other.").
230. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (articulating the definition for submission to a show of
authority).
231. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 389 (1989) (noting that the suspect was released
at the police officers' discretion).
232. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991) (suggesting that one who flees
from law enforcement is not seized); see also United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 771 (2d
Cir. 1990) (recognizing that escape from law enforcement constitutes "unlawful activity").
233. HodariD.,499U.S.at628.
234. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 389 (implying that the suspect was a free citizen after being
released at the police officer's discretion); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536-37 (1979)
2010]
Catholic University Law Review
The first opportunity for release ends personal seizure because the individual's
status in the legal system changes to either "free citizen" or "defendant.,
235
For those restrained by physical force, the first opportunity for release may
occur at several different times, such as when an individual is released by
police officers,236 when an individual is released on bail before a judicial
hearing, when an individual attends a probable-cause hearing, or when an
237individual makes a first appearance before a judicial officer. An individual
who submits to a show of authority is afforded the first opportunity for release
as a free citizen under Justice Stewart's objective standard in Mendenhall when
a reasonable person would feel free to leave based on a totality of the
circumstances 238  or when the individual has been released by law
enforcement. 239 Alternatively, law enforcement may escalate the individual's
seizure status by show of authority to restraint by physical force.
2 40
Given that the transition from restraint or submission to release or detention
effectively changes a "seized" person's status in the legal system, a person no
longer remains restrained by physical force or subject to a show of authority
after being afforded the first legal opportunity for release. 24 1  Under the
(suggesting that persons released on bail and pretrial detainees qualify as defendants given that
these persons are obligated to appear at trial); DRESSLER, supra note 181, at 545 (noting that the
first legal opportunity for release often occurs at the initial hearing before a judicial officer).
235. See DRESSLER, supra note 181, at 8; see also ROBERT HENLEY WOODY, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 41 (2006). When an
individual is released from police custody, his legal status changes from "seized" to "free
citizen." See Graham, 490 U.S. at 389. When an individual is released on bail before a judicial
hearing, the individual's legal status changes from "seized" to "defendant." See Bell, 441 U.S. at
536-37. If an individual elects not to post bail or cannot afford to post bail before a judicial
hearing, this individual has not been afforded the first legal opportunity for release because the
individual's legal status has not changed. See DRESSLER, supra note 181, at 545. Rather, the
individual remains "seized" until the individual's legal status changes. See id. When an
individual attends a probable-cause hearing, the individual's status legally changes from "seized"
to "free citizen" or from "seized" to "defendant," depending on the probable-cause ruling. See
WOODY, supra, at 10-11, 41 (acknowledging that a person becomes a defendant when the
magistrate determines that there is probable cause for arrest); see also DRESSLER, supra note 181,
at 7-8 (noting that the magistrate decides whether the arrestee should be released, afforded bail,
or detained on formal charges at the probable-cause hearing). The first appearance before a
judicial officer is the last time where an individual may be afforded the first legal opportunity for
release because all individuals are assigned for release as free citizens or detention as defendants.
See DRESSLER, supra note 181, at 7-8; see also DEL CARMEN, supra note 7, at 167.
236. See DEL CARMEN, supra note 7, at 29 (noting that a person may be released after law
enforcement issues a summons or citation).
237. DRESSLER, supra note 181, at 545.
238. See Lloyd, supra note 209, at 281 (demonstrating how the antithetical definition
functions as the opposite).
239. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 389 (releasing the suspect after being held in police custody).
240. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
241. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 389 (implying that Graham's legal status changed to free
citizen when the police officers released him); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979)
(suggesting that pretrial detainees were defendants); see also DRESSLER, supra note 181, at 545.
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antithetical definition of personal seizure, illegal escape and the first
opportunity for release account for the various points in time when restraint by
means of physical force242 or submission to a show of authority 243 may end for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the antithetical definition of
personal seizure should be adopted given its flexibility and applicability to all
seizures.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the wake of its decision in Graham, the Supreme Court created a
constitutional gap in determining what constitutional right is implicated in §
1983 excessive-force claims that arise after arrest and before pretrial detention.
Federal courts currently fill this gap in a variety of ways depending on whether
the circuit has adopted or rejected the continuing-seizure rule, which has
resulted in disparate treatment of excessive-force claims across jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, the federal courts' justifications for adopting or rejecting the
continuing-seizure rule fail to comport with the Supreme Court's definition of
personal seizure in Terry. Federal courts, therefore, should adopt the
antithetical definition of personal seizure because it offers a logical solution for
defining the end of personal seizure. The antithetical definition comports with
the Supreme Court's expansive seizure precedent and the flexible principles
established in Terry, and corresponds with the Court's excessive-force
precedent in Graham and Bell.
242. See, e.g., Graham, 490 U.S. 386, 389 (demonstrating that restraint by physical force
ends upon release); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975) (implying that restraint by
physical force ends at a probable-cause hearing given that a magistrate must decide whether to
bring the case before the grand jury); see also DRESSLER, supra note 181, at 545 (noting that an
individual's status in the legal system changes by the time the individual makes a first appearance
before a judicial officer).
243. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988). The antithetical definition of
personal seizure for submission to a show of authority accommodates the flexibility and guidance
desired by the Supreme Court in Michigan v. Chesternut regarding the submission to a show of
authority standard. See id. In Chesternut, Justice Harry Blackmun commended the submission-
to-a-show-of-authority inquiry because it allowed for flexibility and guidance in determining
when personal seizure begins, "[w]hile the test is flexible enough to be applied in the whole range
of police conduct in an equally broad range of settings, it calls for consistent application from one
police encounter to the next, regardless of the particular individual's response to the actions of the
police." Id. Similarly, the antithetical definition of personal seizure provides a flexible test to
measure when seizure ends and requires "consistent application" in identifying the different
points where seizure may end. See id
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